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Abstract— The ability to guarantee safety and progress for
all vehicles is vital to the success of the autonomous vehicle
industry. We present a framework for the distributed control
of autonomous vehicles that is safe and guarantees progress
for all agents. In this paper, we first introduce a new game
paradigm which we term the quasi-simultaneous discrete-time
game. We then define an Agent Protocol agents must use to
make decisions in this quasi-simultaneous discrete-time game
setting. According to the protocol, agents first select an intended
action and then each agent determines whether it can take its
intended action or not, given its proposed intention and the
intentions of nearby agents. The protocol so defined will ensure
safety under all traffic conditions and liveness for all agents
under ‘sparse’ traffic conditions. These guarantees, however,
are predicated on the premise that all agents are operating with
the aforementioned protocol. We provide proofs of correctness
of the protocol and validate our results in simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A prerequisite for introducing autonomous vehicles into
our society is a compelling proof of their safety and efficacy.
The current prevailing methodology used for proving safety
of these vehicles is simulating and test-driving these vehicles
for millions of miles, which is a practice that lacks both
formal verifiability and scalability.
Formal methods offers tools for designing provably correct
control strategies for complex systems like autonomous
vehicles that satisfy high-level behavioral specifications like
safety and liveness [2] for each individual vehicle. The
algorithms used for synthesizing formally-correct strategies
for the vehicles, however, cannot guarantee global safety
since they do not make the assumptions that must hold on
other vehicle behaviors explicit [26], [5], [24].
Instead of reasoning about safety on the individual agent
level, Shoham and Tennenholtz introduce the idea of reason-
ing about safety as a property of the collective of agents [22].
In particular, they introduce the idea of social laws, which
are a set of rules imposed upon all agents in a multiagent
system to ensure some desirable global behaviors like safety
or progress [22], [25]. The design of social laws is intended
to achieve the desirable global behavioral properties in a
minimally-restrictive way [22]. The problem of automatically
synthesizing useful social laws for a set of agents for a
general state space, however, has been shown to be NP-
complete [22].
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The Responsibility-Sensitive-Safety (RSS) framework [21]
adopts a similar top-down philosophy for guaranteeing safety
by providing a set of rules, which if followed by all agents,
guarantees no collisions. In the case of an accident, blame
can be formally assigned. This framework, however is in-
complete since it does not ensure the progress of the vehicles
towards their destinations.
The Assume-Guarantee framework for autonomous vehi-
cles introduced in [16] similarly dictates all agents must
abide by some behavioral contract according to an ordered
set of rules in order to guarantee transparency into the rea-
soning behind agent decisions. The framework is incomplete,
though, as it does not provide safety and liveness guarantees.
The problem of fully guaranteeing safety and liveness of
decision-making agents is especially challenging since 1)
agents are often competing for the same set of resources
(some region of the road network) and 2) agents must
reason about highly-coupled and complex interactions with
other agents. Historically, interactive partially observable
Markov Decision Processes (I-POMDPs) have been proposed
to model these complex interactions—but these methods
lack scalability since they are computationally expensive
[10], [15]. More recently, data-based approaches have been
proposed to simplify the agent reasoning process but these
approaches require large amounts of data and fail to provide
any safety or liveness guarantees [19], [8], [7], [18]. Token-
based conflict resolution approaches for pairwise interactions
between autonomous agents have been studied in [4] as well.
The process for resolving multiple conflicting processes
in a local, decentralized manner is addressed in the Drink-
ing Philosopher problem, which provides a mechanism for
resolving issues arising from synchronous decision-making
[6]. The solution to the Drinking Philosopher problem is
an algorithm that assigns precedence among a set of agents
that have conflicting goals. The algorithm preserves acyclic-
ity and fairness in the precedence graph, thereby ensuring
consistency and fairness among all agents in the game.
Our work is an adaptation of the Drinking Philosopher
Problem to the multi-agent collision-avoidance problem on a
road network, where the resource agents compete for is road
occupancy. We design a decision-making strategy that defines
how agents choose their actions. Minimal communication
among agents allows each agent to consistently establish
precedence and resolve conflicts in a local, decentralized
manner. Unlike previous work by Sahin and Ozay in [20],
our framework leverages the structure of the driving road
network and takes into account the inertial properties of























if all agents operate according to the specified decision-
making strategy.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) The introduction of a new game paradigm, which we
term the quasi-simultaneous discrete-time multi-agent
game.
2) The definition of an agent protocol that defines local
rules agents must follow in two different contexts on a
road network (i.e. road segments and intersections).
3) Safety and liveness proofs when all agents operate
according to these local rules.
4) Simulations as proof of concept of the safety and
liveness guarantees.
II. OVERVIEW
In this overview, we give a high-level presentation of
the main contributions in this work. All the terms will be
formalized and described in further depth in later sections of
the paper.
A. The Quasi-Simultaneous Discrete-Time Game
In this paper, we introduce the quasi-simultaneous
discrete-time multi-agent game. The quasi-simultaneous
game is a modification of turn-based games so that turn
order is defined locally and induced by the agent states as
opposed to being fixed and predefined. This new game format
leverages the structure of the game environment to assign
precedence among agents. In this way, it partially constrains
the set of actions an agent can choose from based on the
agent environment (via the order the agent gets to take its
turn in). The quasi-simultaneous game models the agent’s
decision-making process in a multi-agent game differently
than traditional simultaneous or turn-based games found in
[10] and [8], and to the best of the authors’ knowledge have
not been introduced in the literature before.
B. The Agent Protocol
The Agent Protocol is defined to establish local rules










































Fig. 1: Agent Protocol Architecture.
The novelty of our work is the introduction of a single
backup plan action that all agents rely on. Dependence on
this backup plan action is what ultimately allows for the
decoupling of agent dependencies when reasoning about one
another, while still allowing us to guarantee global properties
like safety and liveness. The following is an overview of
the Agent Protocol. For each time step of the game, each
agent first assigns local precedence according to the rules
described in Section IV-D, thereby establishing a consistent
turn order (in a local manner). Then, each agent evaluates
a set of actions and chooses the best one according to their
own Agent Profile (thereby selecting their intended action),
described in Section IV-E.
Since the turn-order does not fully resolve ambiguity on
which agents should be allowed to take their intended action
at a given time, the action selection strategy, based on 1)
what actions agents ahead of it (in turn) have taken and 2)
the results of the conflict-cluster resolution described in IV-
F, defines how agents should ultimately decide which action
to select. The next sections of this paper will formalize these
ideas and go into greater depth of how these ideas work for
a specific class of agents with a particular set of dynamics.
Note that specific assumptions specified in Sections V and
VI, must hold on the road network for the guarantees to hold.
III. QUASI-SIMULTANEOUS DISCRETE-TIME
MULTI-AGENT GAME
We formalize the definition of a quasi-simultaneous
discrete-time multi-agent game as follows. A state associated
with a set of variables is an assignment of values to those
variables. A game evolves by a sequence of state changes.
A quasi-simultaneous game has the following two properties
regarding state changes: 1) Each agent will get to take a
turn in each time-step of the game and 2) Each agent must
make their turn in an order that emerges from a locally-
defined precedence assignment algorithm (where locality is
described in Section IV-C).
Thus, the state-change is simultaneous yet locally se-
quential because each agent must make a state-change in
a given time step, but it must wait for its turn according to
turn order (defined based on the locally-defined precedence
assignment algorithm) during this time-step. Let us define
some preliminaries before formally defining the game.
We define a quasi-simultaneous game where all agents act
in a local, decentralized manner as follows
G= 〈A,Y ,Act[·],ρ[·],τ[·],P〉 (1)
where
• A is the set of all agents in the game G.
• Y is the set of all variables in the game G.
– Let U be the set of all Y -states, i.e. all possible
assignment of values (states) of the game.
– Given a subset Y ⊆Y , denote by U |Y the projection
of U onto Y , i.e. all possible states of the variables
in the set Y .
• For each agent Ag ∈ A, let:
– SAg be the set U |VAg that contains all possible states
of Ag.
– ActAg be the set of all possible actions Ag can take.
– τAg : SAg×ActAg→ SAg. τAg be the transition function
that defines the state an agent will transition to when
taking an action a ∈ ActAg from a given state.
– ρAg : SAg → 2ActAg be a state-precondition function
that defines a set of actions an agent can take at a
given state.
• P : U → PolyForest(A), is the precedence assignment
function where PolyForest is an operator that maps
a set X to the set of all forests (undirected graphs
whose connected components are trees) defined on the
set X . The polyforest defines the global turn order (of
precedence) of the set of all agents A ∈G based on the
agent states.
Note, the transition function τAg and the state-precondition
function ρAg must be compatible for any agent Ag. In
particular,
∀Ag ∈ A.∀s ∈ SAg.Domain(τAg(s, ·)) = ρAg(s).
A. Agent Game Environment
Here we introduce the game environment agents are op-
erating on.
Definition 3.1 (Road Network): A road network R is a
graph R = (G,E) where G is the set of grid points and
E is the set of edges that represent immediate adjacency
in the Cartesian space among grid points. Note that each
grid point g ∈ G have a set of associated properties P ,
where P = {p,d,lo} which denote the Cartesian coor-
dinate, drivability of the grid point and the set of legal
orientations allowed on the grid point respectively. Note,
p ∈ Z2, d ∈ {0,1} and lo is a set of headings φl where
each φl ∈ {north,east,south,west}.
Let us define R|legal = (G,E|legal) to be a road network
where a directed edge e = (g1,g2) implies a legal (based
on legal orientations) and dynamically-feasible transition
(according to ρAg) exists between the grid points g1,g2 ∈G.
1) Special Grid Point Sets: Grid points where specific
properties hold are given special labels, which can be seen in
Fig. 2. These labels and the associated properties are defined
as follows:
• Ssources, (Ssinks): A set of grid points designated for
Ag to enter (or leave) the road network R from. Any
s ∈ Ssources (s ∈ Ssinks) must be a grid point with no
inbound (outbound) edges in R |legal.
• Sintersection: A set of grid points that contains all grid
points with more than one legal orientation.
• Straffic light: A set of grid points that represent the traffic
light states in the vertical or horizontal direction via its
color (for every intersection).
2) Road Network Decomposition: The road network is
hierarchically decomposed into lanes and bundles, which are
defined as follows:
• Lanes and Bundles: Let lane La(g) define a set of grid
points that contains g and all grid points that form a line
going through g. Let Bu(g) be a set of grid points that
make up a set of lanes that are adjacent or equal to the
lane containing g and have the same legal orientation.
Note, the precise mathematical definitions of lanes and
bundles can be found in the Appendix.
• Road Segments RS: Each bundle can be decomposed
into a set of road segments (separated by intersections).
For each bundle, let us define a graph GRS = (G,E)
where G is a set of grid points and E is a set of
edges between any two grid points g1,g2 where g1,g2 /∈
Sintersection and Bu(g1) = Bu(g2). Road segments Rs(g)
is the set of all grid points that are in the same connected


















Fig. 2: Road network decomposition where each box repre-
sents a grid point.
We introduce the following graph since it will be used in
the liveness proof:
Definition 3.2 (Road Network Dependency Graph): We
define a dependency graph Gdep = (RS,E), RS is the set
of road segments in R and a directed edge e : (r1,r2) for
r1,r2 ∈ RS implies that an agent Ag whose x− y position is
(s.xAg,s.yAg) ∈ r1 depends on the clearance of some agent
Ag′ whose x− y position (s.xAg′ ,s.yAg′) ∈ r2, where s.xAg
and s.yAg are the x and y positions of agent Ag and are
defined formally in Section IV-A.
For clarity of the road network decomposition, refer to
Fig. 2. The precise set of rules that traffic lights are operating
according to can be found in more detail in the Appendix.
IV. AGENT PROTOCOL
In the following section, we present the set of attributes
agents must have and the set of rules agents must adhere to
in order to satisfy our proposed Agent Protocol.
A. Agent Attributes
Each agent Ag is characterized by a set of variables VAg
such that
{IdAg,TcAg,GoalAg} ⊆ VAg
where IdAg, TcAg, and GoalAg are the agent’s ID number,
token count and goal respectively, where the token count
and ID are used in the conflict-cluster resolution defined in
Section IV-F.
In this paper, we only consider car agents such that if Ag∈
A, then VAg includes xAg, yAg, θAg, vAg, namely its absolute
coordinates, heading and velocity. VAg also has parameters:
aminAg ∈ Z,amaxAg ∈ Z,vminAg ∈ Z and vmaxAg ∈ Z
which define the minimum and maximum accelerations and
velocities respectively.
The agent control actions are defined by two parameters:
1) an acceleration value accAg between aminAg and amaxAg
and 2) a steer maneuver γAg ∈{left-turn, right-turn,
left-lane change,
right-lane change, straight}.
The discrete agent dynamics works as follows. At a given
state s at time t, for a given control action (accAg,γAg),
the agent first applies the acceleration to update its velocity
s.vAg,t+1 = s.vAg,t + accAg. Once the velocity is applied, the
steer maneuver (if at the proper velocity) is taken and the
agent occupies a set of grid-points, specified in Fig. 3, while
taking its maneuver.
Agent grid point occupancy is defined as follows. Note
that agents occupy a single grid point at a given time, but
when taking an action, they may occupy a set of grid points.
More formally:
Definition 4.1 (Grid Point Occupancy): The notion of
grid point occupancy is captured by the definitions of the
following maps for each Ag ∈ A. To define the grid point
an agent is occupying at a given time we use the map:
GAg,t : SAg → 2G, mapping each agent to the single grid
point the agent occupies. By a slight abuse of notation, we
let GAg,t : SAg×ActAg → 2G be a function that maps each
s ∈ SAg and a ∈ ρAg(s) to denote the set of all nodes that
are occupied by the agent Ag when it takes an allowable
action a from state s at the time-step t.
The occupancy grids associated with each of the maneuvers
allowed for the agents, and the velocity that the agent has to
be at to take the maneuver are shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: Shows different grid point occupancy associated with
different discrete agent maneuvers.
Note, the safety and liveness guarantees will hold for
any choice of agent dynamic parameters (i.e. amin, amax,
vmin,vmax), but only under the condition that all agents have
the same set of dynamic parameters. The maneuvers must
be the ones specified above.
With slight abuse of notation, we let La(Ag) refer to the
lane ID associated with the grid point (s.xAg,s.yAg), and
Bu(Ag) mean the bundle ID associated with the lane La(Ag).
1) Motion-Planning Algorithm: We assume that any
graph planning algorithm can be used to specify an agent’s
motion plan. The motion plan must be divided into a set of
critical points along the graph that the agent must reach in
order to get to its destination, but should not specify the exact
route agents must take to get to these critical points. It should
be noted the liveness guarantees rely on the assumption that
rerouting of the agent’s motion plan is not supported.
B. Agent Backup Plan Action
A backup plan is a reserved set of actions an agent is
entitled to execute at any time while being immune to being
at fault for a collision if one occurs. In other words, an agent
will always be able to safely take its backup plan action. We
show if each agent can maintain the ability to safely execute
its own backup plan (i.e. keep a far enough distance behind
a lead agent), the safety of the collective system safety is
guaranteed.
The default backup plan adopted here is that of applying
maximal deceleration until a complete stop is achieved,
which is defined as:
Definition 4.2 (Backup Plan Action): The backup plan
action abp is a control action where a = max(amin,−s.vAg).
and γAg = straight. Note, the max is because applying
the deceleration (amin) should not push the car velocity below
0. Note amin is less than 0.
Note, it may take multiple time-steps for an agent to come
to a complete stop because of the inertial dynamics of the
agent.
C. Limits on Agent Perception
In real-life, agents make decisions based on local infor-
mation. We model this locality by defining a region of grid
points around which agents have access to the full (state and
intention) information of the other agents.
1) Road Segments: For road segments, the region around
which agents make decisions cannot be arbitrarily defined.
In fact, an agent’s bubble must depend on its state, and the
agent attributes and dynamics of all agents in the game. In
particular, the bubble can be defined as follows:
Definition 4.3 (Bubble): Let Ag with state s0 ∈SAg. Let
agent Ag′ be another agent. Then the bubble of Ag with
respect to agents of the same type as Ag′ is given by
BAg/Ag′(s0). The bubble is the minimal region of space (set
of grid points) agents need to have full information over to
guarantee they can make a decision that will preserve safety
under the defined protocol. Since all Ag considered in this
paper have the same attributes, for ease of notation, we refer
to the bubble of Ag as BAg.
Fig. 4: Bubble if all Ag ∈ A have the Agent Dynamics
specified in Section IV-A.
For our protocol, the bubble contains any grid points in
which another agent Ag′ occupying those grid points can
interfere with at least one of Ag’s next possible actions and
the backup plan it would use if it were to take any one of
those next actions. With a slight abuse of notation, we say
Ag′ ∈BAg(s) if (s.xAg’,s.yAg’) is on a grid point in the set
BAg(s). The details for the construction of the bubble for an
agent with a particular set of attributes and dynamics can be
found in the Appendix.
2) Intersections: The locality of information agents are
restricted to is relaxed at intersections because agents can
presumably see across the intersection when making deci-
sions about crossing the intersection. More precisely, any
Ag must be able to know about any Ag′ ∈ A that is in the
lanes of oncoming traffic (when performing an unprotected
left-turn). The computation of the exact region of perception
necessary depends on the agent dynamics. Locality for the
local-precedence assignment algorithm is also extended to
this larger region at intersections as well.
D. Precedence Rules
The definition of the quasi-simultaneous game requires
agents to locally assign precedence, i.e. have a set of rules
to define how to establish which agents have higher, lower,
equal or incomparable precedence to it. Our precedence
assignment algorithm is motivated by capturing how prece-
dence among agents is generally established in real-life
scenarios on a road network. In particular, since agents are
designed to move in the forward direction, we aim to capture
the natural inclination of agents to react to the actions of
agents visibly ahead of it.
Before presenting the precedence assignment rules, we
must introduce a few definitions. Let us define: projBlong :A→
Z∪{∅} as projBlong(Ag) = the projection of the Ag’s state
onto the bundle B if Ag is in B and otherwise projBlong(Ag) =
∅. In other words, projBlong(Ag) is the mapping from an
agent to its scalar projection onto the longitudinal axis of the
bundle B the agent Ag is in. If projBlong(Ag
′)< projBlong(Ag),















Fig. 5: Rules for precedence assignment.
For every agent Ag′, the agent Ag defines the precedence
relation between Ag and Ag′ using the following set of
precedence rules:
1) Local Precedence Assignment Rules:
1) If projBlong(Ag
′)< projBlong(Ag) and Bu(Ag
′) = Bu(Ag),
then Ag′ ≺ Ag, i.e. if agents are in the same bundle
and Ag is longitudinally ahead of Ag′, Ag has higher
precedence than Ag′.
2) If projBlong(Ag
′) = projBlong(Ag) and Bu(Ag
′) = Bu(Ag)
, then Ag∼ Ag′ and we say Ag and Ag′ are equivalent
in precedence.
3) If Ag′ and Ag are not in the same bundle, then the two
agents are incomparable.
Each agent Ag ∈ A only assigns precedence according to
the above rules locally to agents within its perception region
(i.e. bubble on road segments and a slightly larger region
at intersections, defined in Section IV-C) when making a
decision of which action to take. Thus, we must show if all
agents locally assign precedence according to these rules,
a globally-consistent turn precedence among all agents is
established. In particular, we need to prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.1: If all agents assign precedence according to
the local precedence assignment rules to agents in their
respective bubbles, then precedence relations will induce a
polyforest on A/∼ (the quotient set of S by ∼).
Proof: (Sketch) This result follows from the total linear
ordering assigned by the first local precedence assignment
rule. The full proof can be found in the Appendix.
The acyclicity of the polyforest structure implies the con-
sistency of local agent precedence assignments. Note, the
local precedence assignment algorithm establishes the order
in which agents are taking turns. Even when this order is
established, it is ambiguous what agents should do either
when 1) agents of equal precedence have conflicting inten-
tions, since they select their actions at the same time or 2) an
agent’s intended action is a lane-change action and requires
agents of lower or equivalent precedence to change their
behavior so the lane-change action is safe. The additional
set of rules introduced to resolve this ambiguity is what we
refer to as conflict cluster resolution, defined in Section IV-F.
E. Assume-Guarantee Profile
An assume-guarantee profile, introduced in [16], is a
mechanism for ordering agent specifications into a specific
hierarchy so the process for choosing an agent’s preferred
action is transparent and safe. The concept is related to the
concepts of minimum-violation planning [24], [5].
In this work, each agent uses an assume-guarantee profile
to propose an intended action. From [16], the assume-
guarantee profile requires defining a set of agent specifica-
tions. For completeness, we define how specifications are
evaluated in the game.
Let r ∈ R denote a specification for an agent and Ag ∈A.
For the specification r, an oracle evaluates whether an agent
taking an action in the current joint state game configuration
will satisfy the specification. More formally, the oracle is
defined as follows OAg,t : R× SAg×ActAg×U → B where
B= {T,F} and the subscript t denotes the time-step the or-
acle is evaluated. These evaluations can easily be refactored
to accommodate specifications that are more continuous in
nature.
In this work, each agent has a total of ten different
specifications, three of whose oracles are defined as follows:
1) OAg,t,dynamic safety(s,a,u): returns T when the action a
from state s will not cause Ag to either collide with an-
other agent or end up in a state where the agent’s safety
backup plan abp is no longer safe with respect to other
agents (assuming other agents are not simultaneously
taking an action).
2) OAg,t,unprotected left-turn safety(s,a,u) returns T when the
action a from the state s will result in the complete
execution of a safe, unprotected left-turn (invariant to
agent precedence). Note, an unprotected left turn spans
over multiple time-steps. The oracle will return T if Ag
has been waiting to take left-turn (while traffic light is
green), traffic light turns red, and no agents in oncoming
lanes.
3) OAg,t,reachability preservation progress(s,a,u) returns T if the
action a from the state s will allow Ag′s planned path
to remain reachable.
The definitions of the other oracles shown in Fig. 6 are
relatively straight-forward and can be found in the Appendix.
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Fig. 6: Assume-guarantee profile that shows ordering of
specifications, where specifications on the same tier are
incomparable to one another.
The ordering of the specifications that each agent must
follow is shown in Fig. 6. In [16], the consistent-evaluating
function W evaluates each action based on the number of
specifications it satisfies in each tier, where actions satisfying
more specifications in the higher tiers are valued more highly.
Details can be found in [16]. The action with the highest
value is then selected as the action the agent takes.
For this work, the agent profile is used to define the agent’s
intended action ai and the agent’s best straight action ast
which is defined in Section IV-G. Note, the dynamic obstacle
safety oracle is not included in the selection of the intended
action ai–otherwise an agent might never propose a lane-
change action (since it would require other agents to yield
in order for the lane-change action to be safe).
F. Conflict-Cluster Resolution
At every time-step t, each agent will know when to take
its turn based on its local precedence assignment algorithm.
Before taking its turn, the agent will have selected an
intended action ai using the Agent profile. When it is the
agent’s turn to select an action, it must choose whether or
not to take it’s intended action ai. When the intended actions
of multiple agents conflict, the conflict-cluster resolution is a
token-based querying method used to help agents determine
which agent should get to take its action.
Under the assumption agents have access to the intentions
of other agents within a local region as defined in Section
IV-C, agents can use the following criteria to define when it
conflicts with another agent.
Definition 4.4 (Agent-Action Conflict): Let us consider an
agent Ag currently at state s ∈ SAg and wants to take action
a ∈ ρAg and an agent Ag′ at state s′ ∈ SAg′ that wants to
take action a′ ∈ ρAg′ . We say that an agent-action conflict
between Ag and Ag′ for a and a′ occurs and write (Ag,s,a)†
(Ag′,s′,a′) if either of the following conditions holds:
• GAg,t(s,a)∩GAg’,t(s′,a′) 6= /0,
• Let st+1 = τAg(s,a) and s′t+1 = τAg′(s




where d(st+1,s′t+1) defines the l2 distance between two states
in the same lane and gapreq is the minimum distance between
two agents in the same lane so that if the agent in front
applies their backup plan, the agent behind will be able
to apply their own backup plan without colliding with the
former. gapreq can easily be computed depending on the
agent dynamics.
In the case that an agent’s action does conflict with another
agent, the agent must send a conflict request that ultimately
serves as a bid the agent is making to take its intended action.
It cannot, however, send requests to any agent (i.e. agents in
front of it). The following criteria are used to determine the
properties that must hold in order for an agent Ag to send a
conflict request to agent Ag′:
1) Criteria that Must Hold for Agent Ag to Send Conflict
Request to Agent Ag’:
• Ag’s intended action ai is a
lane-change action (i.e. γAg ∈
{left-lane change,right-lane change}.
• Ag′ ∈BAg(s), i.e. Ag′ is in agent Ag’s bubble.
• Ag′ - Ag, i.e. Ag has higher precedence than Ag′.
• s.θAg = s.θAg′ , i.e. the agents have the same heading.
• (Ag,ai)†(Ag′,a′i): agents intended actions are in conflict
with one another.
• FAg(u,ai) = F, where FAg(u,ai) is the max-yielding-
not enough flag and is defined below.
Definition 4.5 (maximum-yielding-not-enough flag): The
maximum-yielding-not-enough flag FAg : U × ActAg → B
that is defined as follows:
FAg(u,ai) =
{
T if ∃Ag′ ∈BAg(s)s.t.((Ag,ai)† (Ag′,abp))
F otherwise
When the flag is set, it indicates a configuration in which
even if Ag′ maximally yielded to Ag, if Ag did a lane-change
it would violate the safety of Ag′’s backup plan action.
We note that if FAg(u,ai) is set, Ag cannot send a conflict
request by the last condition. Even though Ag does not send
a request, it must use the information that the flag has been
set in the agent’s Action Selection Strategy.
After a complete exchange of conflict requests, each agent
will be a part of a cluster of agents that define the set of
agents it is ultimately bidding for its priority (to take its
intended action) over. These clusters of agents are defined
as follows:
Definition 4.6 (Conflict Cluster): A conflict cluster
for an agent Ag is defined as CAg = {Ag′ ∈ A |
Ag send Ag′ or Ag′ send Ag}, where Ag send Ag′
implies Ag has sent a conflict request to Ag′. An agents’
conflict cluster defines the set of agents in its bubble that































Fig. 7: Conflict clusters
Once the conflict requests have been sent and an agent
can thereby identify the other agents in its conflict cluster, it
needs to establish whether or not the conflict resolution has
resolved in it’s favor, as shown in Fig. 7.
2) Token Resolution: The conflict resolution strategy must
be fair, meaning each agent always eventually wins a conflict
resolution. The resolution is based on the agents’ token
counts Tc, which is updated by agents to represent how many
times an agent has been unable to take a forward progress
action.
Given the assumption that all agents can query the token
counts of all other agents, let us define the conflict resolution
strategy. For each Ag ∈ A, let WAg ∈ B be an indicator
variable for whether or not the agent has won in its conflict
cluster. Let TcAg represent the token count of the agent when
it has sent its request. Let IdAg represent a unique ID number
of an agent. The conflict cluster resolution indicator variable
WAg is determined as follows:
WAg , ∀Ag′ ∈BAg(s) : (
TcAg′ < TcAg)∨ ((TcAg′ = TcAg)∧IdAg′ < IdAg)
The agent with the highest token count is defined as the
winner of the agents’ conflict cluster and any ties are broken
via an agent ID comparison.
The following lemma, which comes from the definition of
the conflict-cluster resolution scheme, is a helpful for proving
safety of the agent protocol.
Lemma 4.2: At most one agent will win in each agent’s
conflict cluster.
Proof: (Sketch): This follows from the definition of
conflict clusters (i.e. all agents will only send and receive
requests from agents within its bubble), and the winner-takes-
all conflict-cluster resolution. The full proof can be found in
the Appendix.
The next section defines how each agent uses information
from the conflict cluster resolution to ultimately select an
action to take.
G. Action Selection Strategy
The purpose of the agent Action Selection Strategy is to
define whether or not an agent is allowed to take its intended
action ai and if it is not, which alternative action it should
take. The action-selection strategy is defined to coordinate
agents so that lane-change maneuvers can be performed
safely.
In the case where an agent is not allowed to take ai,
the agent is restricted to take either: the best straight action
ast , which is defined in 4.7, or its backup plan action abp.
The action-selection process that determines which of the
three actions an agent Ag will choose is determined by the
following five conditions:
1) ai, the agent’s and other agents’ (in its bubble) intended
actions, which have been selected via the agent profile
and consistent evaluating function defined in Section
IV-E.
2) Ag’s role in conflict request cluster being:
• A conflict request sender (∃Ag′ ∈ BAg(s) :
Ag send Ag′).
• A conflict request receiver (∃Ag′ ∈ BAg(s) :
Ag′ send Ag).
• Both a sender and a receiver of conflict requests.
• Neither a conflict request sender or receiver.
3) The agent’s conflict cluster resolution WAg.
4) Evaluation of OAg,t,dynamic safety(s,ai,u).
5) FAg(u,ai) for Ag is raised, where FAg(u,ai) is the
maximal-yielding-not-enough flag defined in Section
IV-F.
The Action Selection Strategy decision tree, shown in Fig.
8, defines how agents should select which action to take














Fig. 8: Agent action selection strategy.
The best straight action ast , one of the three allowable
actions the agent can take according to the action-selection
strategy, is defined as follows:
Definition 4.7 (Best Straight Action): Let us consider Ag
and its associated action set ρAg(s). Let us define ρAg(s) |st,
{a ∈ ρAg(s) | γAg = straight}, i.e. the set of all al-
lowable straight actions of Ag. The best straight action
ast = argmaxa∈ρAg(s)|st WAg(a), where W is the consistent
evaluating function defined with respect to the agent pro-
file in Fig. 6, with they dynamic obstacle safety oracle
(OAg,t,dynamic safety(s,a,u)) included.
When an agent is both a receiver of a conflict request and
a loser in its conflict cluster, it must yield to the agent that
it received the conflict request from. The Action Selection
Strategy requires the agent takes its backup plan action abp
in these scenarios, where the backup plan action abp is the
control action defined in Definition 4.2.
1) Token Count Update: The token count updates accord-








Safety is guaranteed when agents do not collide with one
another. An agent causes collision when it takes an action
that satisfies the following conditions.
Definition 5.1 (Collision): An agent Ag that takes an ac-
tion a ∈ ActAg will cause collision if either of the following
conditions hold:
1) GAg,t(s,a)∩ (∪Ag′GAg′(s′,a′)) 6= /0.
2) GAg,t(s,a)∩Ost) 6= /0, where Ost = {g∈G | g.d = 0}, i.e.
the set of all undrivable grid points.
In other words, when Ag’s action a causes it to overlap in
occupancy grid with another agent’s occupancy grid or a
static obstacle. Note when the agent Ag′ is not simultane-
ously taking an action with Ag, the occupancy set GAg′(s
′, ·)
is the singleton set for the agent Ag′, representing the single
grid point Ag’ is occupying.
A strategy where agents simply take actions that avoid
collision in the current time-step is insufficient for guaran-
teeing safety because of the inertial properties of the agent
dynamics. The Agent Protocol is thus also defined to avoid
violating the safety of its own and any other agent’s backup
plan action abp defined in Section IV-B. An agent’s backup
plan action abp is evaluated to be safe when the following
conditions hold:
Definition 5.2: [Safety of a Backup Plan Action] Let us
define the safety of an agent’s backup plan action SAg,bp :
U = B, where B = {T,F} is an indicator variable that
determines whether an agent’s backup plan action is safe
or not. It is defined as follows:
SAg,bp(u) = ∧o∈Oo(s,abp,u),
where the set O is the set of all oracles in the top three tiers
of the agent profile defined in Section IV-E.
An agent Ag takes an action a ∈ ActAg that violates the
safety backup plan action of another agent Ag′ when the
following conditions hold:
Definition 5.3 (Safety Backup Plan Violation Action):
Let us consider an agent Ag that is taking an action
a ∈ ActAg, and another agent Ag′. The action (Ag,a)⊥Ag′,
i.e. agent Ag violates the safety backup plan of an agent
Ag′ when by taking an action a where u′ is the state of the
game after Ag has taken its action, then SAg′,bp(u
′) = F.
Note, when Ag 6=Ag′, then Ag can only violate the backup
plan action of the agent Ag′ with its action a if the following
conditions hold:
1) GAg(s,a)∩GAg′(s′,a′) 6= /0,
2) Let st+1 = τAg(s,a) and s′t+1 = τAg′(s
′,a′): If
GAg(st+1),GAg′(st+1) are in the same lane and if
d(st+1,s′t+1)< gapreq,
where d(st+1,s′t+1) and gapreq are the same as defined in
Section 4.4.
The safety proof is based on the premise that all agents
only take actions that do not collide with other agents and
maintain the invariance of the safety of their own and
other agents’ safety backup plan actions. The safety theorem
statement and the proof sketch are as follows.
We can treat the quasi-simultaneous game as a program,
where each of the agents are separate concurrent processes.
A safety property for a program has the form P ⇒ Q,
where P and Q are immediate assertions. This means if the
program starts with P true, then Q is always true throughout
its execution [13].
Theorem 5.1 (Safety Guarantee): Given all agents Ag ∈
A in the quasi-simultaneous game select actions in accor-
dance to the Agent Protocol specified in Section IV, then we
can show the safety property P⇒ Q, where the assertion
P is an assertion that the state of the game is such that
∀Ag,SAg,bp(s,u)=T, i.e. each agent has a backup plan action
that is safe, as defined in Section 5.2. We denote Pt as the
assertion over the state of the game at the beginning of the
time-step t, before agents take their respective actions. Q
is the assertion that the agents never occupy the same grid
point in the same time-step (i.e. collision never occurs when
agents take their respective actions during that time-step).
We denote Qt as the assertion for the agent states/actions
taken at time-step t.
The following is a proof sketch. Note, the full proof can be
found in the Appendix.
Proof: To prove an assertion of this form, we need to
find an invariant assertion I for which i) P⇒ I ii) I ⇒ I
and iii) I ⇒ Q hold. We define I to be the assertion that
holds on the actions that agents select to take at a time-step.
We denote It to be the assertion on the actions agents take at
time t such that ∀Ag, Ag takes a∈ ActAg where 1) it does not
collide with other agents and 2) ∀Ag,SAg,bp(u′) = T where
s′ = τAg(s,a), and u′ is the corresponding global state of the
game after each Ag has taken its respective action a.
It suffices to assume:
1) Each Ag ∈ A has access to the traffic light states.
2) There is no communication error in the conflict requests,
token count queries and the agent intention signals.
3) All intersections in the road network R are governed by
traffic lights.
4) The traffic lights are designed to coordinate traffic such
that if agents respect the traffic light rules, they will not
collide.
5) Agents follow the agent dynamics defined in Section
IV-A.
6) For t = 0, ∀Ag ∈ A in the quasi-simultaneous game is
initialized to:
• Be located on a distinct grid point on the road
network.
• Have a safe backup plan action abp such that
SAg,bp(s,u) = T.
We can prove P⇒Q by showing the following:
1) Pt ⇒ It . This is equivalent to showing that if all agents
are in a state where P is satisfied at time t, then all
agents will take actions at time t where the I holds.
This can be proven using arguments based on the Agent
Protocol showing each agent will always take actions
that 1) do not collide with other agents and 2) will not
violate the safety of its own or other agents’ backup
plan action.
2) I⇒I. If agents take actions such that at time t such
that the assertion It holds, then by the definition of the
assertion I, agents will end up in a state where at time
t+1, assertion P holds, meaning It⇒ Pt+1. Since Pt+1⇒
It+1 from 1, we get I⇒I.
3) I⇒ Q. This is equivalent to showing that if all agents
take actions according to the assertions in I, then
collisions will not occur. This follows in the immediate
time-step from Condition 1 in, and the fact that all Ag
have a safe backup plan action abp to choose from when
Condition 2 holds, and will always be able to (and will)
take an action from which it can avoid collision in future
time steps.
Proof of safety alone is not sufficient reason to argue for
the effectiveness of the protocol, as all agents could simply
stop for all time and safety would be guaranteed. A liveness
guarantee, i.e. proof that all agents will eventually make it
to their final destination, is critical. In the following section,
we present liveness guarantees.
VI. LIVENESS GUARANTEES
Note, we introduce the definition of liveness from [13], as
follows:
Definition 6.1 (Liveness): A liveness property asserts that
program execution eventually reaches some desirable state.
For our paper, we describe the eventual desirable state for
each agent is to reach their respective final destinations.
Proving fairness, as described in [13], is proving that each
action will always terminate, and is fundamental for proving
liveness. Additionally for liveness, the absence of 1) dead-
locks and 2) collisions also need to be proved. Deadlock
occurs when agents indefinitely wait for resources held by
other agents [17]. Since the Manhattan grid road network
has loops, agents can enter a configuration in which each
agent in the loop is indefinitely waiting for a resource held
by another agent. When the density of agents in the road
network is high enough, deadlocks along these loops will
occur. We can therefore guarantee liveness only when certain
assumptions hold on the density of the road network.
Definition 6.2 (Sparse Traffic Conditions): Let M denote
the number of grid points in the smallest loop (defined
by legal orientation) of the road network, not including
grid points g ∈Sintersections. The sparsity condition must be
such that N < M − 1, where N is the number of agents
in the road network. Note, these sparsity conditions are
conservative because it is a bound defined by the worst
possible assignment of agents and their destinations (i.e.
where all agents enter the smallest loop).
Now, we introduce the liveness guarantees under these
sparse traffic conditions. The proof of liveness is based on
the fact that 1) agent profile include progress specifications
and 2) conflict precedence is resolved by giving priority to
the agent that has waited the longest time (a quantity that is
reflected by token counts).
Theorem 6.1 (Liveness Under Sparse Traffic Conditions):
Under the Sparse Traffic Assumption given by Definition
6.2 and given all agents Ag ∈ A in the quasi-simultaneous
game select actions in accordance to the Agent Protocol
specified in Section IV, liveness is guaranteed, i.e. all
Ag ∈ A will always eventually reach their respective goals.
The following is a proof sketch. The full proof can be
found in the Appendix.
Proof: It suffices to assume:
1) ∀Ag∈A, ∀Ag′ ∈BAg in road segments, and ∀Ag′ within
a local region around the agent as defined in Section IV-
C at intersections, Ag has access to other agents’ state
and intended action.
2) Each Ag ∈ A has access to the traffic light states.
3) There is no communication error in the conflict requests,
token count queries and the agent intention signals.
4) For t = 0, ∀Ag ∈ A in the quasi-simultaneous game is
initialized to:
• Be located on a distinct grid point on the road
network.
• Have a safe backup plan action abp such that
SAg,bp(u) = T.
5) The traffic lights are red a window of time ∆ttl such
that tmin < ∆ttl < ∞, and tmin is defined so that agents
are slowed down sufficiently long such that an agent
waiting to make a lane-change to a critical tile is such
that its max-yielding-flag is not always set to T.
6) The static obstacles are not on any grid point g where
g.d = 1.
7) Each Ag treats its respective goal Ag.g as a static
obstacle.
8) Bundles in the road network R have no more than 2
lanes.
9) All intersections in the road network R are governed
by traffic lights.
and prove:
1) The invariance of a no-deadlock state follows from the
sparsity assumption and the invariance of safety (no
collision) follows from the safety proof.
2) Inductive arguments related to control flow are used to
show that all Ag will always eventually take a ∈ ActAg
where Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
a) Let us consider a road segment r ∈ RS that contains
grid point(s) g∈Ssinks, i.e. the road segment contains
grid points with sink nodes. Inductive arguments
based on the agents’ longitudinal distance to desti-
nation grid points are used to show every Ag∈ r will
be able to always eventually take a∈ ActAg for which
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
b) Let us consider a road segment rs ∈ RS. Let us
assume ∀rs ∈ RS,∃(rs,rs′) ∈ Gdep, i.e. the clearance
of rs depends on the clearance of all rs′. Inductive
arguments based on agents’ longitudinal distance to
the front of the intersection are used to show that any
Ag on rs will always eventually take a∈ ActAg where
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
c) For any R where the dependency graph Gdep (as
defined in Section 3.2) is a directed-acyclic-graph
(DAG), inductive arguments based on the linear or-
dering of road segments rs ∈ Gdep are used to prove
all Ag ∈ A will always eventually take a ∈ ActAg for
which Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
d) When the graph Gdep is cyclic, the Sparsity Assump-
tion 6.2 breaks the cyclic dependency and allows for
the similar induction arguments in 2c to apply.
3) By the above inductive arguments and the definition of
the forward progress oracle Oforward progress(s,a,u), all
Ag will always eventually take actions that allow them
to make progress towards their respective destinations.
Features of the Agent Protocol, like fairness from the
conflict-cluster resolution and eventual satisfaction of all
oracles in the agent profile are used for the arguments in
the proof.
VII. SIMULATION
In order to streamline discrete-time multi-agent simula-
tions, we have built a traffic game simulation platform called
Road Scenario Emulator (RoSE). This emulator offers an
easy-to-use, simple, and modular interface. We use RoSE to
generate different game scenarios and simulate how agents
will all behave if they each follow the agent strategy pro-
tocol introduced in this paper. We simulate the game with
randomized initialization of spawning agents at the source
nodes for three different road network environments: 1) the
straight road segment, 2) small city blocks grid and 3) large
city blocks grid. A snapshot of a small city blocks grid
simulation is shown in Fig. 9. The agent attributes are as
follows: vmin = 0, vmax = 3, amin = −1, and amax = 1. For
each road network environment, we simulate the game 100
times for t = 250 time-steps.
Fig. 9: Simulation
For all simulation trials collision does not occur. Although
liveness is only guaranteed in sparse traffic conditions, we
simulate for a number of agents N > M−1 specified in the
sparsity condition and deadlock does not occur. In particular,
for the straight road segment, on average 77%, 36% and 43%
made it to their respective destinations on the respective maps
by the end of the 250 time-steps.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a novel paradigm for
designing safety-critical decision-making modules for agents
whose behavior is extremely complex and highly-coupled
with other agents. The main distinction of our proposed
architecture from the existing literature, is the shift from
thinking of each agents as separate, individual entities, to
agents as a collective where all all agents adopt a common
local, decentralized protocol (where additional customization
can be built in later). The protocol defines the agent at-
tributes, the region it must reason over (i.e. the bubble), how
the agent chooses its intended agent, and how it ultimately
selects which action to take. With this protocol, we are
able to formally guarantee specifications safety and liveness
(under sparse traffic conditions) for all agents. We validate
the safety and liveness guarantees in a randomized simulation
environment.
The current work still lacks 1) liveness guarantees in all
scenarios, 2) robustness to imperfect sensory information
and 3) does not account for other agent types like pedes-
trians and cyclists. Future work will focus on modifying
the agent strategy architecture to prevent the occurrence of
the loop deadlock introduced in Section VI from occurring.
In addition to providing stronger liveness guarantees, the
architecture must be modified in a way to effectively accom-
modate impartial and imperfect information. We also hope to
accommodate a diverse, heterogenous set of car agents and
also other agent types like pedestrians and cyclists. Although
the work needs to be extended to make more applicable to
real-life systems, we believe this work is a first step towards
defining a comprehensive method for guaranteeing safety and
liveness for all agents in an extremely dynamic and complex
environment.
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A. Road Network
The following defines the set of properties that grid points
can have.
1) Grid Point Properties: The set of properties P =
{p,d, lo} of each grid point g ∈ G, where p ∈ Z2 denotes
the Cartesian coordinate of the grid point, d ∈ {0,1}, which
denotes whether a node is drivable or not and lo are the
legal orientations, which is a set of headings φl where each
φl ∈ {north,east,south,west} that contains the set of
legal orientations on the grid point. The set lo may be empty
when the grid point is not drivable.
The road network is hierarchically decomposed into lanes
and bundles, which are defined informally as follows:
• Lanes: Let lane La(g) denote a set of grid points that
contains all grid points that are in the same ‘lane’ as
g. La(g) = {g′|projx(g′.p) = projx(g.p) or projy(g.p) =
projy(g.p),
g′.φl = g.φl ,g.drivable= g′.drivable = 1}.
• Bundles: First, we define the set of adjacent lanes a
lane La(g) as adj(La(g)) = {La(g′) | ∃e = (ĝ, ĝ′) ∈
R s.t. (ĝ ∈ La(g), ĝ′ ∈ La(g′)) and ĝ.φl = ĝ′.φl}. This
represents the set of lanes La(g) in the same direction
and is adjacent to. Let N(g) = adj(La(g)). Let bundle
Bu(g) denote a set of lanes that are all connected to one
another and is defined recursively as follows:
Bu(g) =
{
La(g)∪N(g) if N(g) 6= /0
La(g) otherwise
B. Bubble Construction
In order to define the bubble for the agent dynamics
specified in Section IV-A, we present some preliminary
definitions. We first introduce the backup plan node set
(which is defined recursively) as follows:
Definition 0.1 (Backup Plan Node Set): Let Ag ∈ A and
s0 ∈ SAg. The backup plan grid point set BPAg(s0) is all
the grid points agent Ag occupies as it applies maxi-
mum deceleration to come to a complete stop. BPAg(s0) =
GAg(s0,abp) ∪ BPAg(τAg(s0,abp)) if τAg(s0,abp).v 6= 0 and
BPAg(s0) = GAg(τ(s0,abp)) otherwise, where amin is the
agent’s action of applying maximal deceleration while keep-
ing the steering wheel at the neutral position.
Definition 0.2 (Forward/Backward Reachable States):
The (1-step) forward reachable state set of agent Ag
denoted RAg(s0) represents the set of all states reachable
by Ag from the state s0. The forward reachable set is
defined as RAg(s0) , {s ∈ SAg | ∃a ∈ ρAg(s0).s = τ(s0,a)}.
Similarly, we define the (1-step) backward reachable
state set R−1Ag (s0) as the set of all states from
which the state s0 can be reached by Ag. Formally,
R−1Ag (s0), {s ∈ SAg | ∃s ∈ SAg.∃a ∈ ρAg(s).s0 = τ(s,a)}.
Definition 0.3 (Forward Reachable Nodes): We denote
by G RAg(s0) the forward reachable node set, namely, the
set of all grid points that can be occupied upon taking the
actions that brings the agent Ag from its current state s0 to





This set represents all the possible grid points that can be
occupied by an agent in the next time step.
Definition 0.4 (Occupancy Preimage): For n ∈ G, where
G are the nodes in the road network graph R, the occupancy
preimage G R
−1
Ag (n) is the set of states of agent Ag from which




Ag (n) = {s ∈ SAg | ∃a ∈ ρAg(s).n ∈ GAg(s,a)}
In the next section we define several different sets of grid
points that are defined to represent the locations where two
agents may possibly interfere with one another, which are
shown in Fig. 10. The bubble is defined to be the union of
these sets of grid points.
Fig. 10: Bubble if all Ag ∈ A have the Agent Dynamics
specified in Section IV-A. Construction of this set defined in
the Appendix.
We begin by considering the ego agent whose bubble we
are defining. In particular, let us again consider an agent Ag
at state s0 ∈ SAg. The corresponding grid point set G RAg(s0) is
shown in the left-most figure in Fig. 10. The grid points an
agent occupies when executing its backup plan from a state





These grid points are shown in the second from the left sub-




represents all the grid points an agent can possibly reach in
the next state or in the following time step were it to execute







defines the set of all states in which another agent Ag′ can
reach any grid point in the other agents’ forward reachable
grid points ZAg(s0). Let us define the grid point projection
of these states as
G RAg′(Ag,s0), {GAg′(s) | s ∈S
R
Ag′(Ag,s0)}
These grid points are defined in the third from the left
subfigure in Fig. 10.
The bubble also needs to include any state where an agent
Ag′ where the agent has so much momentum it cannot stop
fast enough to avoid collision with the agent Ag. To define
the set of states from which this might occur, let us define
the set:
S BPAg′ (Ag,s0) = {s ∈ SAg′ | BPAg′(s)∩ZAg(s0) 6= /0}.
If another agent Ag′ occupies a state in this set, then
execution of that agent’s backup plan will cause it to intersect
with the set of grid points that are in agents set ZAg(s0). Let





This is the set of all states backward reachable to the states
in S BPAg′(Ag,s0). If an agent Ag
′ occupies any of these states,
it will end up in a state where its backup plan will intersect
with agent Ag’s potential grid points that are defined in ZAg.
We project this set of states to a set of grid points as
G R,BPAg′ (Ag,s0) = {GAg′(s) | s ∈S
BP
Ag′ (Ag,s0)}
Note, this set of grid points is shown in the right-most
subfigure in Fig. 10. The bubble is then defined as the union
of all the sets of grid points specified above.
Definition 0.5 (Bubble): Let us consider an agent Ag with
state s0 ∈ SAg and agent Ag′ be another agent. Then the





Note that under almost all circumstances, we should have
ZAg(s0)⊆ G RAg′(Ag,s0)⊆ G
R,BP
Ag′ (Ag,s0)
so BAg(s0) is simply equal to G
R,BP
Ag′ (Ag,s0). This holds true
for the abstract dynamics we consider in this paper. This
means the bubble contains any grid points in which another
agent Ag′ occupying those grid points can interfere (via its
own forward reachable states or the backup plan it would
use in any of its forward reachable states) with at least one
of agent Ag’s next possible actions and the backup plan it
would use if it were to take any one of those next actions.
Lemma 0.1: If all agents assign precedence according to
the local precedence assignment rules to agents in their
respective bubbles, then the precedence relations will induce
a polyforest on A/ ∼, where S/ ∼ defines the quotient set
of a set S.
Proof: Suppose there is a cycle C in A/ ∼. For each
of the equivalent classes in C (C must have at least 2 to be
a cycle), choose a representative from A to form a set RC.
Let Ag ∈ RC be one of these representatives. Applying the
second local precedence assignment rule inductively, we can
see that all agents in RC must be from Ag’s bundle. By the
first local precedence assignment rule, any C edge must be
from an agent with lower projected value to one with a higher
projected value in this bundle. Since these values are totally
ordered (being integers), they must be the same. This implies
that C only has one equivalence class, a contradiction.
C. Oracle Definitions
1) Ostatic safety(s,a,u) returns T when the action a from
state s will not cause the agent to collide with a static
obstacle or end up in a state where the agent’s safety
backup plan abp with respect to the static obstacle is no
longer safe.
2) Otraffic light(s,a,u) returns T if the action a from the
state s satisfies the traffic light laws (not crossing into
intersection when red. It also requires that Ag be able to
take abp from s′ = τAg(s,a) and not violate the traffic-
light law.
3) Olegal orientation(s,a,u) returns T if the action a from the
state s follows the legal road orientation.
4) Otraffic intersection clearance(s,a,u) returns T if the action
causes the agent to enter the intersection and leave it
when the traffic light turns red and if the action causes
the agent to end up in a state where if it performs its
backup plan action, it will still be able to leave the
intersection.
5) Otraffic intersection lane change(s,a,u) returns T if the action
is such that
γAg = {left-lane change,right-lane change}
and the agent either begins in an intersection or ends
up in the intersection after taking the action.
6) Omaintains progress(s,a,u) returns T if the action a from
the state s stays the same distance to its goal.
7) Oforward progress(s,a,u) returns T if the action a from
the state s will improve the agent’s progress towards
the goal.
D. Safety Lemmas
In the following lemma, we show that an agent cannot send
(or receive) a conflict request to (from) an agent outside its
bubble.
Lemma 0.2: Let us consider agent Ag with state s and
agent Ag′ at state s′. Ag send Ag′⇒ Ag ∈BAg′(s′).
Proof: If A send B this means that all of the condi-
tions specified in Section IV-F.1 must hold. IV-F.1 specifies
that (A,ai)† (B,a′i). This condition is only valid if either 4.4
holds, which implies projGs ∈ GF,B(B,A) or that 4.4 holds,
which would imply
projGs∈GF,BP(B,A). Membership of Agent A’s state in either
of these sets implies A ∈B(B).
The following lemma follows from the lemma above.
Lemma 0.3: At most one agent will win in each agent’s
conflict cluster.
Proof: W.l.o.g. let us consider an agent Ag and its
respective conflict cluster C (Ag). It follows from Lemma
0.2 that ∀Ag′, s.t. Ag send Ag′Ag′ ∈ BAg(s) and Ag ∈
BAg′(s′). It also follows that ∀Ag′ s.t. ,Ag send Ag′,Ag∈
BAg′(s
′) and Ag′ ∈BAg(s). This means an agent has access
to all token counts and IDs of all agents in its conflict cluster,
and all agents in its conflict cluster have access to the agent’s
token count and ID. The conflict resolution implies that all
agent edges are incident to the winning agent, where edges
point to the agent they cede to. This implies that at most
one agent can be the winner of each cluster. Less than one
winner (per conflict cluster) will occur when an agent that
is in the intersection of more than one conflict cluster wins.
The following lemma states that if all Ag∈A are following
the Agent Protocol, an agent Ag will not take an action that
will cause it to 1) collide with or 2) violate the safety backup
plan of another agent outside its bubble BAg(s).
Lemma 0.4: If Ag is following the Agent Protocol, and
SAg,bp(u) = T, Ag will only choose an action a ∈ ActAg
for which the following two conditions hold: 1) GAg(s,a)∩
(∪Ag′∈SGAg′(s′,a′)) = /0 and 2) ∀Ag′ ∈ S, ¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′),
where the set S, {Ag′|Ag′ /∈BAg(s)∧((Ag′∼Ag)∨(Ag′≺
Ag)∨ (Ag≺ Ag’))}.
Proof: This follows from the definition of the agent
bubble, whose construction is defined in Section -B.
The following lemma states that an agent Ag following the
Agent Protocol will not take an action for which it violates
the safety of its own backup plan.
Lemma 0.5: If Ag is following the Agent Protocol,
and SAg,bp(u) = T, Ag will only choose an action a ∈
ActAg for which the following condition holds: ∀Ag′ ∈ S,
¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′), where S = {Ag}.
Proof: We prove this by using definitions of elements
in the Agent Protocol.
1) Let us first show any action a ∈ ActAg that Ag takes
will satisfy the oracles in the top two tiers (safety and
traffic rules) of Ag’s profile defined in Section. IV-E.
a) According to the Action Selection Strategy defined in
Section IV-G, Ag will choose one of three actions:
the agent’s intended action ai, the best straight action
ast , or its backup plan action abp.
b) Let us consider the actions ai and ast .
i) Both ai and ast is selected via the Agent Profile
and consistent-function evaluator defined in Sec-
tion IV-E.
ii) Since SAg,bp(u) = T, the agent will have at least
one action (abp) for which the top two tiers of
specifications are satisfied.
iii) By definition of the Agent Profile and the consis-
tent evaluator function, if SAg,bp(u)=T, the safety
backup plan action abp will always be chosen over
an action where any of the specifications in the
top two tiers of the profile are not satisfied.
iv) By 1(b)ii and 1(b)iii, Ag will have a ∈ ActAg and
will choose an action for which the top two tiers
of the Agent Profile are satisfied and thus ai and
ast are actions where all oracles in the top two
tiers of the profile are satisfied.
c) Let us consider the action abp.
i) This follows from the assumption that SAg,bp(u)=
T and the definition of SAg,bp(u).
2) If the oracles in the top two tiers are satisfied by an
action a, by the definition of the oracles in Section IV-
E, this implies the action a will take Ag to a state s′
and the system will be in a new global state u′ where
SAg,bp(u′) = T.
3) SAg,bp(u′) = T means Ag will end up in a state
where abp will be an action that satisfies traffic rules,
avoids inevitable collision with static obstacles, and
thus will not violate its own safety backup plan action
¬((Ag,ai)⊥Ag).
The following lemma states that if all Ag∈A are following
the Agent Protocol, any agent Ag will not take an action for
which it collides with or violates the safety backup plan of
any agent with higher precedence than it.
Lemma 0.6: If Ag is following the Agent Protocol, and
SAg,bp(u) = T, Ag will only choose an action a ∈ ActAg
for which the following two conditions hold: 1) GAg(s,a)∩
(∪Ag′∈SGAg′(s′,a′)) = /0 and 2) ∀Ag′ ∈ S, ¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′),
where the set S , {Ag′|Ag ≺ Ag′}, i.e. agents with higher
precedence than Ag.
Proof: We prove this by using arguments based on
the definition of precedence, the Agent Protocol, and Agent
Dynamics.
1) Let us first consider all Ag′ where Ag≺Ag′ and Ag′ /∈
BAg(s).
a) Proof by Lemma 0.4.
2) Now, let us consider all Ag′ where Ag≺Ag′ and Ag′ ∈
BAg(s).
3) According to Lemma 0.5, Ag will only take an action
that satisfies all oracles in the top two tiers, including
Odynamic safety(s,a,u).
4) Since a is such that Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T, by defini-
tion of the oracle, Ag will not cause collision with any
Ag′ ∈BAg(s).
5) For any Ag ≺ Ag′, where Ag′ has higher precedence
than Ag, then projlong(Ag) < projlong(Ag
′), i.e. Ag′ is
longitudinally ahead of Ag.
6) In order for (Ag,a)⊥Ag′, the action a would have to
have to be such that s f = τAg(s,a), and La(s f ) = La(s′)
and projlong(Ag) > projlong(Ag
′), where Ag is directly
in front of Ag′.
7) Because of the agent dynamics defined in Section IV-
A, any a such that (Ag,a)⊥Ag′ will require G (Ag,a)∩
G (Ag′) 6= /0.
8) Thus, any such action a will not satisfy the oracle
Odynamic safety(s,a,u).
9) Since SAg,bp(u) = T, by Assumption 6 in Section -E,
the agent will have at least one action abp for which
Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T.
10) Since the agent will only choose an action for which
Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T and it always has at least one
action abp that satisfies the oracle, the agent will al-
ways choose an action for which Odynamic safety(s,a,u) =
T and thus will take an action such that ∀Ag′ ∈
S¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′).
The following lemma states that if all Ag∈A are following
the Agent Protocol, any agent Ag will not take an action for
which it collides with or violates the safety backup plan of
any agent with lower precedence than it.
Lemma 0.7: If Ag is following the Agent Protocol, and
SAg,bp(u) = T, Ag will only choose an action a ∈ ActAg
for which the following two conditions hold: 1) GAg(s,a)∩
(∪Ag′∈SGAg′(s′,a′)) = /0 and 2) ∀Ag′ ∈ S, ¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′),
where the set S , {Ag′|Ag′ ≺ Ag}, i.e. agents with lower
precedence than Ag.
Proof: We prove this by using arguments based on
the definition of precedence, the Agent Protocol, and Agent
Dynamics.
1) Let us first consider all Ag′ where Ag≺Ag′ and Ag′ /∈
BAg(s).
a) Proof by Lemma 0.4.
2) Now, let us consider all Ag′ where Ag≺Ag′ and Ag′ ∈
BAg(s).
3) According to 3, Ag will only take an action that
satisfies all oracles in the top two tiers, including
Odynamic safety(s,a,u).
4) Since a is such that Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T, by defini-
tion of the oracle, Ag will not cause collision with any
Ag′ ∈BAg(s).
5) According to the Action Selection Strategy defined in
Section IV-G, Ag will choose one of three actions: the
agent’s intended action ai, the best straight action ast ,
or its backup plan action abp.
6) Let us consider the backup plan action abp.
a) By violation of safety backup plan, ((Ag,abp)⊥Ag′)
only if La(Ag) = La(Ag′).
b) W.l.o.g., let us consider Ag′ that is directly behind
Ag.
c) Since SAg′,bp(s,u) = T, by Assumption 6 in Section
-E, Odynamic safety(s,abp,u) = T, meaning Ag′ will be
far enough behind Ag so that if Ag executes its
backup plan action abp, Ag′ can safely execute its
own backup plan action.
d) Thus, by Definition 5.3, ¬((Ag,abp)⊥Ag′).
7) Let us consider the best straight action ast .
a) This follows from the arguments made in 6, since ast
is a less severe action that abp.
8) Let us consider the intended action ai.
a) Let us consider when γAg = {straight}.
i) This follows from 6.
b) Let us consider when γAg ∈ {right-turn,
left-turn}.
i) If Ag takes such an action, Ag will end up
in a state where Bu(Ag′) 6= Bu(Ag) and from
Definition 5.3, agent in different bundles cannot
violate each others’ backup plans.
c) Let us consider when γAg ∈ {right-lane
change, left-lane change}.
i) (Ag,ai)⊥Ag′ when ai is a lane change and the
agent Ag and Ag′ are at a state such that s f =
τ(s,ai) and s′f = τ(s
′,abp) respectively, where
d(s f ,s′f ) < gapreq, where d(s f ,s
′
f ) is the l2 dis-
tance between s f and s′f .
ii) When this condition holds, the agent’s max-
yielding-not-enough flag FAg(u,ai), defined in
Section 4.5 will be set.
iii) According to the action-selection strategy, Ag will
only take ai when FAg(u,ai) = F.
iv) Thus, Ag will only take ai when ¬((Ag,ai)⊥Ag′).
The following lemma states that if all Ag∈A are following
the Agent Protocol, any agent Ag will not take an action for
which it collides with or violates the safety backup plan of
any agent with equal precedence.
Lemma 0.8: If Ag is following the Agent Protocol, and
SAg,bp(u) = T, Ag will only choose an action a ∈ ActAg
for which the following two conditions hold: 1) GAg(s,a)∩
(∪Ag′∈SGAg′(s′,a′)) = /0 and 2) ∀Ag′ ∈ S, ¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′),
where the set S, {Ag′|Ag′∼Ag}, i.e. agents with equivalent
precedence as the agent.
Proof: We prove this by using arguments based on the
definition of precedence, Agent Dynamics, and the Agent
Protocol.
1) Let us first consider all Ag′ where Ag≺Ag′ and Ag′ /∈
BAg(s).
a) Proof by Lemma 0.4.
2) Now, let us consider all Ag′ where Ag≺Ag′ and Ag′ ∈
BAg(s).
3) Let us first consider the agent itself, since an agent has
equivalent precedence to itself.
a) This is true by Lemma 0.5.
4) For any other agents of equivalent precedence that is
not the agent itself, can be proven as follows.
5) Agents with equal precedence take actions simultane-
ously so Odynamic safety(s,a,u) does not guarantee no
collision.
6) According to the Action Selection Strategy defined in
Section IV-G, Ag will choose one of three actions: the
agent’s intended action ai, the best straight action ast ,
or its backup plan action abp.
7) By definition of precedence assignment, any Ag′ for
which Ag′ ∼Ag will be such that La(Ag) 6= La(Ag′). .
8) Let us show if Ag selects abp, it will 1) not collide with
any Ag′ ∈ S and 2) ¬((Ag,abp)⊥Ag′).
a) W.l.o.g. let us consider Ag′ where Ag′ ∼ Ag.
b) The flag FAg’(u,ai) = T if Ag′s intended action
ai causes collision with Ag or (Ag′,ai)⊥Ag, i.e. it
collides with or violates the safety of Ag’s backup
plan action.
c) By the action-selection-strategy, Ag′ will not take is
action ai when FAg’(u,ai) = T so this guarantees Ag
will not collide with Ag′ when Ag takes abp.
d) By the Agent Dynamics, Ag’s backup plan action
cannot cause Ag to end up in a position where it
can violate Ag′’s backup plan without colliding with
it–for which Ag′’s flag FAg(u,ai) would be set.
9) Let us show Ag will only choose an ast if it will 1) not
collide with Ag′ ∈ S and 2) ¬((Ag,ast)⊥Ag′).
a) When ast = abp then the arguments in 8 hold.
b) Ag selects an ast that is not abp only when 1) its
conflict cluster is empty (i.e. CAg = /0) or 2) when it
has received a conflict request from another agent and
it has won its conflict cluster resolution (i.e. WAg =
T).
c) If CAg = /0, by definition of how conflict clusters are
defined in Section 4.6, the agent’s action ast will not
cause Ag to collide with any Ag′ ∈ S, and ∀Ag′ ∈
S,¬((Ag,ast)⊥Ag′).
d) In the case Ag has received a conflict request and has
won WAg, by Lemma 0.2, if WAg = T, it will be the
only agent in its conflict cluster that has won.
e) By definition of the conflict cluster, any Ag′ ∈ CAg
where Ag∼ Ag′ will take a straight action.
f) Since agents of equivalent precedence are initially
in separate lanes by 7 and any Ag′ ∈ S will take a
straight action, then La(sAg,t+1) 6= La(sAg’,t+1) when
Ag takes ast .
g) Thus, by definition of agent dynamics and Definition
5.3, the action will not cause Ag to collide with any
Ag′ ∈ S, and ∀Ag′ ∈ S,¬((Ag,ast)⊥Ag′).
10) Let us show Ag will only choose an ai if it will 1) not
collide with any Ag′ ∈ S and 2) ¬((Ag,ai)⊥Ag′).
a) Let us consider when γAg = straight for ai.
i) This follows from the same arguments presented
in 9.
b) Let us consider when γAg ∈{right-turn,
left-turn} for ai.
i) This follows from the fact that all other agents
are following the Agent Protocol and will not
take a lane-change action in the intersection, and
because of the definition of the Agent Dynamics
and Road Network.
c) Let us consider when γAg ∈ {right-lane
change, left-lane change}.
i) Ag will only take its intended action ai if the flag
FAg(u,ai) = F and in the case that it is part of
a conflict cluster, it is the winner of the conflict
cluster resolution, i.e. WAg = T,
ii) By definition of FAg(u,ai), the agent will not take
ai when ai causes Ag to collide with any agent
Ag′ ∈ S or when it causes Ag to violate the safety
of the back up plan of another agent Ag′, i.e. ∃Ag′
s.t. (Ag,ai)⊥Ag′.
iii) In the case the agent has received a conflict
request and has won WAg, by Lemma 0.2, if
WAg = T, it will be the only agent in its conflict
cluster that has won.
iv) By definition of the conflict cluster, any Ag′ ∈CAg
where Ag∼ Ag′ will take its backup plan action
abp, and thus s f = τ(s,ast), and s′f = τ(s,abp),
where d(s f ,s′f )≥ gapreq.
v) Thus, ai will only be selected when ai does not
cause Ag to collide with any Ag′ ∈ S and
∀Ag′ ∈ S,¬((Ag,ai)⊥Ag′).
The following lemma states that if all Ag∈A are following
the Agent Protocol, any agent Ag will not take an action for
which it collides with or violates the safety backup plan of
any agent with incomparable precedence to it.
Lemma 0.9: If Ag is following the Agent Protocol, and
SAg,bp(u) = T, Ag will only choose an action a ∈ ActAg
for which the following two conditions hold: 1) GAg(s,a)∩
(∪Ag′∈SGAg′(s′,a′)) = /0 and 2) ∀Ag′ ∈ S, ¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′),
where the set S , {Ag′|Ag′ 6∼ Ag}, i.e. agents with prece-
dence incomparable to the agent.
Proof: We prove this by using arguments based on the
definition of precedence, Agent Dynamics, and the Agent
Protocol.
1) Let us show when Ag chooses abp it will 1) not collide
with any Ag′ ∈ S and 2) ¬((Ag,abp)⊥Ag′).
a) Since SAg,bp(u) = T, the agent will have at least
one action (abp) for which the top two tiers of
specifications are satisfied.
b) By 1a, the action abp will only take Ag into intersec-
tion if the traffic light is green.
c) By Assumption 4, all traffic lights are coordinated
so if agents respect traffic light rules, they will not
collide.
d) By the assumption that all other Ag′ ∈G are obeying
the same protocol, each agent will only take actions
that satisfy top two tiers of their profile.
e) Any Ag′ in a perpendicular bundle will not enter
intersection since they have a red light.
f) Thus, Ag cannot collide or violate the backup plan
of agents in perpendicular bundles.
g) Any Ag′ in an oncoming traffic bundle must only take
an unprotected left-turn when it satisfies
Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u).
h) Thus Ag will not collide or violate the backup plan
of agents in bundles of oncoming traffic.
2) Let us show when Ag chooses ast it will 1) not collide
with any Ag′ ∈ S and 2) ¬((Ag,ast)⊥Ag′).
a) Since ast is chosen according to the Agent Profile, it
will only be a straight action that is not abp as long as
it satisfies the top-two tiers of the profile and more.
b) Thus, ast will only take Ag into intersection if traffic
light is green.
c) By the same arguments in 1, this holds.
3) Let us show when Ag chooses ai it will 1) not collide
with any Ag′ ∈ S and 2) ¬((Ag,ai)⊥Ag′).
a) Let us consider when ai is such that γAg =
straight.
i) This follows from the same arguments presented
in 2.
b) Let us consider when ai is such that γAg ∈
{left-lane change,right-lane change}.
i) Ag will never select such an action at an in-
tersection since Ointersection lane-change(s,a,u) will
evaluate to F.
c) Let us consider when ai is such that γAg ∈
{left-turn, right-turn}.
i) By the assumption that all other agents are fol-
lowing the Agent Protocol, Ag that are in bundle
perpendicular to Bu(Ag) will not be in the inter-
section and will not collide with Ag.
ii) Further, the agent will only take γAg =
right-turn when Odynamic safety(s,a,u) =
T and Otraffic light(s,a,u) = T. Thus,
¬((Ag,ai)⊥Ag′).
iii) For an action ai where γAg = left-turn,Ag
will only take ai if Otraffic-light(s,a,u) = T and
Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u) = T.
iv) Since all agents are following the traffic laws
based on Proof -E, Otraffic light(s,a,u) = T means
action will not cause agent to collide with or vio-
late the safety of the backup plan in perpendicular
bundles.
v) By the definition of the unprotected-left-turn or-
acle, Ag will only take the left-turn action when
it does not violate the safety of the backup plan
of agents in oncoming traffic.
E. Safety Proof
Theorem 0.10: Given all agents Ag ∈ A in the quasi-
simultaneous game select actions in accordance to the Agent
Protocol specified in Section IV, then we can show the safety
property P⇒Q, where the assertion P is an assertion that
the state of the game is such that ∀Ag,SAg,bp(s,u) = T, i.e.
each agent has a backup plan action that is safe, as defined
in 5.2. We denote Pt as the assertion over the state of the
game at the beginning of the time-step t, before agents take
their respective actions. Q is the assertion that the agents
never occupy the same grid point in the same time-step
(i.e. collision never occurs when agents take their respective
actions during that time-step). We denote Qt as the assertion
for the agent states/actions taken at time-step t.
Proof: To prove an assertion of this form, we need to
find an invariant assertion I for which i) P⇒ I ii) I ⇒ I
and iii) I ⇒ Q hold. We define I to be the assertion that
holds on the actions that agents select to take at a time-step.
We denote It to be the assertion on the actions agents take at
time t such that ∀Ag, Ag takes a∈ ActAg where 1) it does not
collide with other agents and 2) ∀Ag,SAg,bp(u′) = T where
s′ = τAg(s,a), and u′ is the corresponding global state of the
game after Ag has taken its action a.
It suffices to assume:
1) Each Ag ∈ A has access to the traffic light states.
2) There is no communication error in the conflict requests,
token count queries and the agent intention signals.
3) All intersections in the road network R are governed by
traffic lights.
4) The traffic lights are designed to coordinate traffic such
that if agents respect the traffic light rules, they will not
collide.
5) Agents follow the agent dynamics defined in Section
IV-A.
6) For t = 0, ∀Ag ∈ A in the quasi-simultaneous game is
initialized to:
• Be located on a distinct grid point on the road
network.
• Have a safe backup plan action abp such that
SAg,bp(s,u) = T.
We can prove P⇒Q by showing the following:
1) Pt ⇒ It . This is equivalent to showing that if all agents
are in a state where P is satisfied at time t, then all
agents will take actions at time t where the I holds.
a) In the case that the assertion Pt holds, let us
show Ag will only choose an action a ∈ ActAg
for which the following two conditions hold: 1)
GAg(s,a)∩ (∪Ag′∈SGAg′(s′,a′)) = /0 and 2) ∀Ag′ ∈ S,
¬((Ag,a)⊥Ag′), where the set S is:
i) The set S , {Ag′|Ag ≺ Ag′}, i.e. agents with
higher precedence than Ag. Proof by Lemma 0.6.
ii) S, {Ag′|Ag′≺Ag}, i.e. agents with lower prece-
dence than Ag. Proof by Lemma 0.7.
iii) S, {Ag′|Ag′ ∼Ag}, i.e. agents with equal prece-
dence than the agent. Proof by Lemma 0.8.
iv) S, {Ag′|Ag′ 6∼ Ag}, i.e. agents with precedence
incomparable to the agent. Proof by Lemma 0.9.
b) The set of all agents: agents with lower precedence,
higher precedence, equal precedence and incompara-
ble precedence, is complete and includes all agents.
c) By 1-1(a)iv and 1b, an agent will not take an ac-
tion that will cause collision with any other agents
(including itself) or violate the safety of the safety
backup plan of all other agents and thus any action
taken by any agent will be such that following the
action, the assertion P still holds.
2) I⇒I. If agents take actions such that at time t such
that the assertion It holds, then by the definition of the
assertion I, agents will end up in a state where at time
t+1, assertion P holds, meaning It⇒ Pt+1. Since Pt+1⇒
It+1 , from 1, we get I⇒I.
3) I⇒ Q. This is equivalent to showing that if all agents
take actions according to the assertions in I, then
collisions will not occur. This follows in the immediate
time-step from Condition 1 in, and the fact that all Ag
have a safe backup plan action abp to choose from when
Condition 2 holds, and will always be able to (and will)
take an action from which it can avoid collision in future
time steps.
F. Liveness Lemmas
Lemma 0.11: If the only a ∈ ActAg for an agent
Ag for which Odestination reachability(s,a,u) = T and
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T is an action such that:
γAg ∈ {right-turn, left-turn} and the grid-
point s f = τAg(s,a) is unoccupied (for a left-turn, where a
is the final action of the left-turn maneuver), Ag will always
eventually take a.
Proof: W.l.o.g. let us consider agent Ag ∈ A in the
quasi-simultaneous game G. We prove this by showing
that all criteria required by the Agent Protocol are always
eventually satisfied, thereby allowing Ag to take action a.
1) By the definition of R and the agent dynam-
ics, when Ag is in a position where only γAg ∈
{right-turn,left-turn}, it will neither send nor
receive requests from other agents and FAg(u,ai) will
never be set to T.
2) In accordance to the Action Selection Strategy, for Ag
to take action a, all the oracles in the Agent Profile must
be simultaneously satisfied (so it will be selected over
any other a′ ∈ ActAg). Thus, we show:
a) The following oracle evaluations will always hold
when Ag is in this state:
Otraffic intersection lane-change(s,a,u) = T
Olegal orientation(s,a,u) = T, Ostatic safety(s,a,u) = T and
Otraffic intersection clearance(s,a,u) = T.
i) The first oracle is True vacuously and the fol-
lowing are true by the road network constraints
and agent dynamics, Assumptions 6, and the As-
sumption in the lemma statement that s f = τ(s,a)
is unoccupied respectively.
b) To show the following oracles will always eventually
simultaneously hold true, let us first consider when
γAg = {right-turn}.
i) By the assumption, the traffic light is red for a
finite time, and when the traffic light is green,
Otraffic light(s,a,u) = T.
ii) Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u) is vacuously true for a
right-turn action.
iii) Since Otraffic intersection clearance(s,a,u) = T and by
the safety proof -E, all Ag are only taking actions
in accordance with traffic laws so there will never
be any Ag′ ∈A blocking the intersection, making
Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T.
iv) Thus, all oracles are always eventually simulta-
neously satisfied and Ag can take a where γAg =
{right-turn}
c) Let us consider when γAg = {left-turn}.
i) By Assumption 5, traffic lights are green for a
finite time.
ii) By the safety proof -E, all Ag are only taking ac-
tions in accordance with traffic laws so there will
never be any Ag′ ∈ A blocking the intersection.
iii) When γAg = left-turn, by definition
of the unprotected left-turn oracle,
♦Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u), specifically when
the traffic light switches from green to red and
Ag has been waiting at traffic light.
iv) Thus, ♦Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u) after light
turns from green to red.
v) Further, Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u) = T combined
with Otraffic intersection clearance(s,a,u) = T implies
Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T.
vi) Thus, all oracles are always eventually simulta-
neously satisfied and Ag can take a where γ =
{left-turn}
3) Thus, we have shown all oracles in the Agent Profile
will always eventually be satisfied, and Ag will take a
such that Odestination reachability(s,a,u) = T and
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
Lemma 0.12: If the only a ∈ ActAg for which
Odestination reachability(s,a,u) = T and Oforward progress(s,a,u) =
T is when a has
γAg ∈ {right-lane change, left-lane change}
and the grid-point(s) G (s,a) is (are) either unoccupied or
agents that occupy these grid points will always eventually
clear these grid points, Ag will always eventually take this
action a.
Proof: W.l.o.g. let us consider agent Ag ∈ A in the
quasi-simultaneous game G. We prove this by showing
that all criteria required by the Agent Protocol are always
eventually satisfied, thereby allowing Ag to take its action a.
1) Let us consider Case A, when a is such that s f =
τAg(s,a) = GoalAg, i.e. the action takes the agent to
its goal, and let us show Ag will always eventually be
able to take a.
2) In accordance to the Action Selection Strategy, for Ag to
take a is that 1) all the oracles in the agent profile must
be simultaneously satisfied (so the action a is chosen
over any other a′ ∈ ActAg, 2) FAg(u,ai) = 0 and 3)
WAg = T.
3) We first show all the oracles for Ag will always be
simultaneously satisfied:
a) When Ag is in this state, the following oracle evalu-
ations always hold: Otraffic light(s,a,u) = T,
Otraffic intersection lane-change(s,a,u) = T,
Ounprotected left turn(s,a,u) = T,
Otraffic intersection clearance(s,a,u), Ostatic safety(s,a,u) =
T, Otraffic orientation(s,a,u) = T.
i) The first four hold vacuously and the others hold
by Assumption 6, and the last holds by Agent
dynamics and the Road Network.
b) Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T.
i) By the definition road network R, agent dynamics
in Section IV-A and the condition that ∀Ag ∈ A
will leave R (i.e. Ag does not occupy any grid
point on R when it reaches its respective goal
GoalAg). Thus, Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T when-
ever an agent is in this state.
4) In accordance to the action selection strategy, for Ag
to take a it must be that FAg(u,ai) = 0, i.e. the max-
yielding-flag-not-enough must not be set. Let us show
this is always true.
a) The only Ag′ that can cause the FAg(u,ai) = 1 of Ag
is when an agent Ag′ is in a state where La(Ag′) =
GoalAg.
b) W.l.o.g. let us consider such an Ag′. By liveness
Assumption 7, upon approaching the goal, the agent
Ag′ must be in a state where Ag′ backup plan action
abp will allow it to come to a complete stop before
reaching its goal.
c) By 4b, Ag′ will always be in a state for which the
max-yielding-not-enough flag for Ag is FAg(u,ai) =
0.
5) In accordance to the action selection strategy, for Ag to
take a is that WAg = 1. Let us show that this is always
eventually true.
a) In the case that Ag has the maximum number of
tokens, WAg = 1 and Ag will be able to take its
forward action since all criteria are satisfied.
b) Any Ag′ ∈ CAg will be of equal or lower precedence
than Ag.
c) Any Ag′ with the maximum number of tokens will
move to its goal since WAg = 1 and all the other
criteria required for that agent to takes its action will
be True.
d) By Definition of the Action Selection Strategy in Sec-
tion IV-G, any agent Âg that replaces Ag′ will have
taken a forward progress action and its respective
token count will reset to 0.
e) Thus, any Ag′ will be allowed to take its action before
Ag but Ag’s token count TcAg will increase by one
for every time-step this occurs.
f) Thus, by 5d and by 5e Ag will always eventually
have the highest token count in its conflict cluster
such that WAg = 1.
g) Since conditions 3 and 4 are always true, and 5
is always eventually true, then all conditions will
simultaneously always eventually be true and the Ag
will always eventually take the action a.
6) Let us consider Case B, when a is the final
action to take for an agent to reach its sub-
goal (i.e. a critical left-turn or right-turn tile), and
let us show Ag will always eventually be able
to take a forward progress action where γAg ∈
{left-lane change,right-lane change}.
7) In accordance to the Action Selection Strategy, for Ag
to take a is that 1) WAg = 1, 2) FAg(u,ai) = 0, i.e. the
max-yielding-flag-not-enough must not be set and 3) all
the oracles in the Agent Profile must be simultaneously
satisfied.
8) Let us first consider when WAg = 1, then WAg until Ag
takes its forward progress action a because by definition
of WAg, Ag has the highest token count in its conflict
cluster, Ag.tc= Ag.tc+1 while Ag does not select a
(and thus does not make forward progress) and any Ag
that newly enters Ag’s conflict cluster will have a token
count of 0.
9) All the oracles are either vacuously or trivially satisfied
by the assumptions except for Odynamic safety(s,a,u).
10) By the lemma assumption that all Ag′ occupying grid
points will always eventually take their respective for-
ward progress actions, ♦Odynamic safety(s,a,u).
11) By the Assumption 5, the traffic light will always cycle
through red-to-green and green-to-red at the intersection
Ag is located at.
12) By the Assumption on the minimum duration of the
red traffic light, all Ag′ will be in a state such that
FAg(u,ai) = 0.
13) Thus, all criteria for which Ag can take its forward
progress action a will be simultaneously satisfied.
14) When WAg = 0, we must show ♦WAg.
a) For Ag, all agents in its conflict cluster have equal
or lower precedence and are not in the same lane as
Ag.
b) For any such Ag′ with equal precedence, Ag′ will
always eventually take its forward progress action by
the arguments in 8-14 if Ag′ intends to make a lane-
change.
c) By the lemma assumption, any agents Ag′ occupying
the grid points that Ag needs to take its action will
always eventually take its forward progress action so
♦Odynamic safety(s,a,u).
d) Any Âg with lower precedence and higher token
count that Ag will take Ag′’s position and in doing so
will have a token count of 0 and any Ag that replaces
any agents with higher token count than Ag and is in
Ag’s conflict cluster will have token count 0.
e) Thus ♦WAg.
Lemma 0.13: Let us consider a road segment rs ∈ RS
where there exist grid points g ∈ Ssinks. Every Ag ∈ rs
will always eventually be able to take a ∈ ActAg for which
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
Proof: We prove this by induction. W.l.o.g, let us con-
sider Ag ∈ A. Let mAg = projlong(GoalAg)−projlong(Ag.s).
1) Base Case: mAg = 1, i.e. Ag only requires a single action
a to reach its goal GoalAg.
a) If a is such that
γAg ∈{left-lane change, right-lane change},
then Ag will take always eventually this action by
Lemma 0.12.
b) If a is such that γAg = straight:
c) In accordance to the Action Selection Strategy, for Ag
to take a is that 1) all the oracles in the agent profile
must be simultaneously satisfied (so the action a is
chosen over any other a′ ∈ ActAg, 2) WAg = 1.
d) First, we show that all oracles in the agent profile
will always be simultaneously satisfied.
i) These all follow from the same arguments
presented when γAg = {right-lane
change,left-lane change} in Case
A in Lemma 0.12
e) In accordance with the Action Selection Strategy, we
must show that ♦WAg. This is vacuously true since
no Ag will be in the agent’s conflict cluster when an
agent is in this state.
2) Case m = N: Let us assume that any ∀Ag where mAg =
N always eventually take a ∈ ActAg for which
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
3) Case m = N +1: Let us show ∀Ag where mAg = N +1
always eventually take a for which
Oforward progress = T.
a) Any Ag for which mAg > 1 will always
have an a where γAg = straight such that
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
b) Thus, we show Ag always eventually will take γAg =
straight such that Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
c) W.l.o.g. let us consider Ag for which mAg = N +1.
d) In accordance to the Action Selection Strategy, for
Ag to take a is 1) WAg = 1 and 2) all the oracles in
the agent profile must be simultaneously satisfied (so
the action a is chosen over any other a′ ∈ ActAg).
e) In accordance with the Action Selection Strategy, we
must show ♦WAg.
i) Any Ag′ ∈CAg will be an agent of equal or higher
precedence and in a separate lane.
ii) Any such agent with higher token count than Ag
that is in its conflict cluster will always eventually
be able to go by the inductive assumption in 2.
iii) After all such agents take a forward progress
action, they will no longer be in Ag’s conflict
cluster and Ag will have the highest token count
since all Ag that newly enter conflict cluster will
have token count of 0.
f) After the assignment WAg = 1, WAg until Ag selects
a. This is true because by definition of WAg, Ag
has the highest token count in its conflict cluster,
Ag.tc= Ag.tc+1 while Ag does not select a, and
any Ag that enters Ag’s conflict cluster will have a
token count of 0.
g) Let us show the oracles in the Agent Profile will
always evaluate to T.
i) The same arguments in Lemma 0.12.1 for all
oracles except for Odynamic safety(s,a,u), where
♦Odynamic safety(s,a,u) = T by the inductive As-
sumption 2.
Lemma 0.14: Let Ag be on a road segment rs∈RS, where
RS is the set of nodes in the dependency road network
dependency graph Gdep. Let rs be a road segment for
which ∀rs′ ∈ RSs.t.∃e : (rs′,rs), each road segment rs′ has
vacancies in the grid points where Ag ∈ rs would occupy
if it crossed the intersection (i.e. s f = τAg(s,a)), we show
Ag will always eventually take an action a ∈ ActAg where
Oprogress oracle(s,a,u) = T.
Proof: We prove this with induction. W.l.o.g, let us con-
sider Ag ∈A. Let mAg = projlong(gfront of rs)−projlong(Ag.s),
where gfront of intersection represents a grid point at the front of
the road segment.
1) Base Case mAg = 0: Let us consider an Ag whose
next action will take will bring Ag to cross into the
intersection and show Ag will always eventually take a
for which Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
a) If the only a where Oforward progress = T is such
that γAg ∈ {left-turn, right-turn}, proof by
Lemma 0.11.
b) If the only a where Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T is such
that γAg = straight.
i) In accordance to the Action Selection Strategy,
for Ag to take a is that 1) all the oracles in the
Agent Profile must be simultaneously satisfied (so
the action a is chosen over any other a′ ∈ ActAg,
2) WAg = 1.
A) Ounprotected left-turn(s,a,u) = T,
Otraffic intersection lane-change(s,a,u) = T,
Ostatic safety(s,a,u) = T,
Otraffic intersection clearance(s,a,u) = T
Olegal orientation(s,a,u) = T.
B) The first two oracles are true vacuously, fol-
lowed by Assumption 6, and by agent dy-
namics and the road network R definition
respectively and by the assumption in the
lemma statement.
C) ♦Otraffic light(s,a,u) by Assumption 5.
D) Odynamic obstacle(s,a,u) = T because by the
safety proof, all Ag take a ∈ ActAg that sat-
isfy first top tiers of Agent profile so there
will be no Ag′ ∈ A that are in the intersec-
tion when the traffic light for Ag is green.
Thus, whenever Otraffic light(s,a,u) = T, then it
Odynamic obstacle(s,a,u) = T as well.
ii) WAg = 1 vacuously since neither Ag or any
Ag′ ∈ A will send a conflict request at the
front of the intersection since all ai must sat-
isfy Otraffic intersection lane-change(s,a,u) according to
Safety Proof in Section A-E.
c) By the safety proof in -E, Ag will only take a∈ActAg
that satisfy the top two tiers of the Agent Profile, so
Ag will not take an a where
γAg ∈{left-lane change,right-lane change}
into an intersection.
2) Case mAg = N: Let us assume that Ag with mAg = N
will always eventually take a ∈ ActAg for which
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
3) Case mAg =N+1: Let us show any Ag that is a longitu-
dinal distance of N+1 from the destination, will always
eventually take a for which Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
a) Let us consider when Ag’s only a such that
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T is
γAg ∈ {right-lane change,left-lane
change }.
b) Although Ag may not have priority (since it does not
have max tokens in its conflict cluster), any Ag that
occupies grid points G (s,a,u) will always eventually
make forward progress by Argument 1.
c) Once these agents have made forward progress, any
Âg that replace Ag′ will have a TcAg = 0 and since
Ag is always increasing its token counts as it cannot
make forward progress, it will always eventually have
the max tokens and thus have priority over those grid
points.
d) Thus, this can be proven by using Case B in Lemma
0.12.
e) For all other a ∈ ActAg are actions for which γAg =
straight, and the and same arguments as in the
proof of straight actions for rs with g ∈Ssinks in 3
hold.
G. Liveness Proof
Theorem 0.15 (Liveness Under Sparse Traffic Conditions):
Under the Sparse Traffic Assumption given by 6.2 and
given all agents Ag ∈ A in the quasi-simultaneous game
select actions in accordance to the agent protocol specified
in Section IV, liveness is guaranteed, i.e. all Ag ∈ A will
always eventually reach their respective goals.
Proof: It suffices to assume:
1) ∀Ag ∈ A, ∀Ag′ ∈ BAg, Ag knows Ag′.s,Ag′.i, i.e. the
other agent’s state Ag.s and intended action ai and all
Ag within a region around the intersection defined in
the Appendix.
2) Each Ag ∈ A has access to the traffic light states.
3) There is no communication error in the conflict requests,
token count queries and the agent intention signals.
4) For t = 0, ∀Ag ∈ A in the quasi-simultaneous game is
initialized to:
• Be located on a distinct grid point on the road
network.
• Have a safe backup plan action abp such that
SAg,bp(u) = T.
5) The traffic lights are red for some time window ∆ttl
such that tmin < ∆ttl < ∞, where tmin is defined in the
Appendix in Section -H.1.
6) The static obstacles are not on any grid point g where
g.d = 1.
7) Each Ag treats its respective goal Ag.g as a static
obstacle.
8) Bundles in the road network R have no more than 2
lanes.
9) The road network R is such that all intersections are
governed by traffic lights.
and prove:
1) The invariance of a no-deadlock state follows from the
sparsity assumption and the invariance of safety (no
collision) follows from the safety proof.
2) For any R where the dependency graph Gdep (as defined
in 3.2) is a directed-acylcic-graph (DAG), we prove all
Ag ∈A will always eventually take a ∈ ActAg for which
Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T inductively as follows.
a) A topological sorting of a directed acyclic graph G
= (V, E) is a linear ordering of vertices V such that
(u,v) ∈ E→ u appears before v in ordering.
b) If and only if a graph G is a DAG, then G has a
topological sorting. Since Gdep is a DAG, it has a
topological sorting.
c) We can then use an argument by induction on the
linear ordering provided by the topological sorting to
show that all Ag always eventually take a∈ ActAg for
which Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
i) Let l denote the linear order associated with the
road network dependency graph Gdep, where an
ordering of l = 0 denotes a road segment with
source nodes.
ii) Base Case l = 0. This can be proven true by
Lemma 0.13.
iii) Let us assume this is true for any road segment
where l = N.
iv) Under the Inductive Assumption 2(c)iii, there will
be clearance in any road segment that agent Ag
in road segment where the linear order l = N +1
depends on for Ag to make forward progress to
its destination.
v) Since all Ag are following the traffic laws by the
Safety proof in -E, the clearance spots will be
given precedence to Ag ∈ rs for a positive, finite
time and thus the assumptions required in Lemma
0.11 and 0.12 used to prove Lemma 0.14 will
hold.
vi) Thus, the Lemma 0.14 can be used to show that
all Ag for which l = N+1 always eventually take
an action for which Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
3) When the graph Gdep is cyclic, the Sparsity Assumption
6.2 can be used to prove all agents always eventually
take an action for which Oforward progress(s,a,u) = T.
a) The sparsity assumption 6.2 ensures there is at least
one vacancy in any map loop.
b) Let us consider Ag inside a map loop.
i) Let us consider Ag in the loop for which the
vacancy is directly ahead of Ag. If the vacancy
is directly ahead of Ag, then if the only forward
progress action a keeps Ag in the loop, Ag will
always eventually take its action by Lemmas 0.11,
0.12 and arguments in Lemma 0.14 1b. If the
only forward progress action a makes Ag leave
the loop, Ag will always eventually take its action
by the sparsity assumption 6.2 and the inductive
arguments in the Liveness proof argument 2c.
ii) By 3(b)i, it can then be inductively shown that
any Ag in the loop will always eventually have a
vacancy for which it can take a forward progress
action.
c) Let us consider Ag on a road segment that is not part
of a map loop.
i) Let us consider an action a that takes Ag into a
map loop. If the grid point required by Ag to make
forward progress is occupied, by 3(b)ii, it will al-
ways eventually be unoccupied. If the only action
Ag can take is such that γAg = {lane-change}
since all Ag′ in the loop are reset when they
take forward progress action, Ag will always
eventually have the max token count. Thus, the
same arguments in Lemma 0.12 hold. If the only
action Ag can take is such that Ag crosses into an
intersection, the traffic light rules ensure Ag has
precedence over any Ag in the loop. Thus, Ag will
always eventually take a forward progress action
by Lemma 0.11 and Lemma 0.14 1b.
ii) For any action a that does not take Ag into a
map loop, Ag can take a forward action because
of the sparsity assumptions 6.2 and the inductive
arguments in the Liveness proof argument 2c.
4) By the induction arguments and by definition of the
forward progress oracle Oforward progress(s,a,u), all Ag
will always eventually take actions that allow them to
make progress to respective destinations, and liveness
is guaranteed.
H. Traffic Light Assumptions
A traffic light grid point contains three states
g.s = {red,yellow,green}. The traffic lights at each
intersection are coordinated so that if all agents obey the
traffic signals, collision will not occur (i.e. the lights for the
same intersection will never be simultaneously green) and
the lights are both red for long enough such that Ag that
entered the intersection when the light was yellow will be
able to make it across the intersection before the other traffic
light turns green.
1) Traffic Light Minimum Time: In order to guarantee that
agents will always eventually be able to make a lane-change
to a critical tile, the traffic light has to be red for sufficiently
long such that any Ag′ that may cause FAg(u,ai) = T is
slowed down for long enough such that Ag can take its lane-
change action. This can be computed simply once given the
dynamics of Ag. Normally a simple heuristic can be used
instead of computing this specific lower-bound.
I. Simulation Maps
Fig. 11: Straight road map environment.
Fig. 12: City blocks map environment.
J. Simulation Environment Features
A road network environment, complete with legal lane
orientations, intersections, and traffic lights, can be specified
via a CSV file. The specified (by the user) road network
environment forms a map data structure graph, which de-
composes the roads into bundles, mentioned in IV-D.
The map will automatically parse the boundaries and
lane directions of the road network to define where agents
can either spawn from or exit the road network. In each
game scenario, agents will randomly spawn according to a
specified spawn rate.
Each agent has the following attributes in our simulation:
parameters like min and max velocity and accelerations,
dynamics specified by agent actions and their corresponding
occupancy grids, goal location, agent color, ID, token count.
Note, these attributes can be modified depending on what
the user wants to include. For each agent, a graph-planning
algorithm is used to compute a high-level motion plan on
the map graph to get the agent to its goal.
Each game scenario is comprised of the road network
graph and a set of agents (constantly changing over time
as new agents spawn and old agents reach their goals and
leave). The game is simulated forward for a specified number
of time steps and the traces from the simulation are saved.
The animation module in RoSE animates the traces from the
simulated game.
RoSE also offers a collection of debugging tools to help
reconstruct scenarios that occurred during a simulated game.
If the user would like to regenerate the same initialization,
the simulation has a feature where users can specify a
specific randomization seed. There is a configuration tool
that allows users to prescribe the states of a set of agents
and their respective goals. A final debugging tool outputs
the variables of the agent that were relevant to the decision-
making process.
